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Abstract
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more eﬀort from workers, except
perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate eﬀort,
ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the in-
centive eﬀect of tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on the impact of
sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjec-
tive peer evaluation or “oﬃce politics.” We discuss a real eﬀort experiment in which
eﬀort, quality adjusted output and oﬃce politics are compared under piece rates and
tournaments. Our results suggest that tournaments increase eﬀort only in the absence
of oﬃce politics. Competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments
and, as a result, workers actually provide less eﬀort simply because they expect to be
the victims of sabotage. Adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent
auditor shrinks the incentive eﬀect of the tournament even further since output tends
to become more slipshod.
"The person who says ‘I’m not political’ is in great danger ... Only the ﬁttest will
survive, and the ﬁttest will be the ones who understand their oﬃce’s politics."
Jean Hollands, quoted in Playing Oﬃce Politics, Newsweek, 16 September 1985
1 Introduction
T h e r ei ss t i l lm u c he c o n o m i s t sd on o tk n o wa bo u tt h ei n c e n t i v ee ﬀects of tournaments, despite
the widespread use of compensation schemes based on relative performance measures. The
causes and consequences of sabotage, for example, are much better understood in principle
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1(Lazear 1989, Chen 2003, Grund and Sliwka 2005) than in practice. To our knowledge, there
are just two empirical studies of sabotage based on non-experimental data: Garicano and
Palacios-Huerta (2006) ﬁnd that when soccer teams have more incentive to win, they devote
more eﬀort both to scoring goals and to dirty play, with no net change in scoring and,
in a more traditional vein, Drago and Garvey (1998) conclude on the basis of a survey of
Australian manufacturing that when the incentives for promotion are sharp, workers expend
less "helping eﬀort."
Given Falk and Fehr’s (2003) observation that experimental methods are especially well-
suited to the study of tournaments, it comes as a surprise how few controlled studies of
sabotage have been published. The principal contributors to this small literature have been
Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003a, 2003b, 2005) and Falk and Fehr (2002), who have considered
the eﬀects of variations in the number of competitors, the number of prizes, the prize spread,
the contract choices available to principals and communication on destructive activities.
Our paper extends this literature in at least two important directions. First, we explore
the eﬀects of sabotage within the context of a real eﬀort tournament. While there is some
debate about the diﬀerences between real and chosen eﬀort designs (Bruggen and Strobel
2007, for example), we were concerned about the representativeness of chosen eﬀort designs
and share the concerns of van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2001, p.189), who remind
us that real work "involves eﬀort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other aﬀectations not
present" in chosen eﬀort.
Second, and no less important, our design reﬂects a diﬀerent and, in some work envi-
ronments, more plausible notion of sabotage. Sabotage in the lab is almost always diﬀuse
and blunt.I ti sd i ﬀuse in the sense that, with the notable exception of Harbring, Irlenbusch,
Krackel and Selten (2004), it is not directed at individuals: destructive activities are assumed
to reduce the output of all other subjects. It is our impression, however, that in practice, the
saboteur’s aim is often much narrower, in part because diﬀuse punishment is more diﬃcult
for the target to interpret and, therefore, costlier to impose. It is blunt because what is
represented in most, if not all, experiments is the physical destruction of output, one of the
most extreme forms of sabotage. In reality a worker doesn’t alwyas need to produce more
output than her rivals to win a promotion tournament, but rather create an impression, well-
founded or otherwise, that she has. When individual eﬀort levels are diﬃcult to rank order,
let alone measure, this is often a simpler, but more subtle, task, and one with indirect eﬀects
2on output: a worker who fears that her contributions to output will be misrepresented could
well decide to expend less eﬀort. Our experimental design allows for two forms of directed
sabotage: subjects both counted, and evaluated the quality of, the output of each of their
rivals and, in some treatments, compensation depended, in part, on these evaluations.
These peer evaluations are perhaps best understood as a metaphor for oﬃce politics,
one purpose of which is to inﬂuence, at some cost, decision makers’ beliefs about relative
performance. To achieve this end, the "politician" in this experiment has two sorts of
misinformation at her disposal, one more subtle, and perhaps easier to rationalize, than the
other. As a theoretical matter, we know that "inﬂuence activities" (Milgrom and Roberts
1988) of this sort can even lead ﬁrms to abandon internal promotion in favor of external
recruitment (Chan 1996).
A more literal, but we believe complementary, interpretation is that the protocol em-
bodies what industrial psychologists and others would call "360◦ review" or "multi-source
feedback" (MSF), since compensation depends on the evaluations of both supervisor and
peers. Until recently, the consensus (McEvoy and Buller 1987, for example) was that most
workers disliked MSF, and that this dislike was more pronounced when the results were used
to determine compensation or otherwise evaluate performance. Furthermore, consistent with
our results, resistance to peer evaluation is not limited to one’s own assessment, but the ef-
fects of "friendship bias" (Kane and Lawler 1978) and other norms on the evaluations of
others.
We ﬁnd that sabotage or oﬃce politics more than reverse the incentive eﬀects of a tourna-
ment: adjusted output per worker is less than that achieved under piece rates. Furthermore,
the principal manifestation of this decrease is quality, not quantity. Expectations are then
identiﬁed as the proximate cause of this decline: if workers expect that their contributions
to the ﬁrm will be misrepresented, eﬀort is scaled back. In addition, these expectations are
warranted: as the diﬀerences between workers increase, so does sabotage. We also discern
evidence of an aﬀective response to tournaments, even in the absence of an incentive to
sabotage.
The experimental design is described in the next section and in the section after that,
we discuss our results in broad terms. The fourth section then reports estimates for output
and sabotage functions.
32 Experimental Design
Instead of following in the rich tradition of “eﬀort choice” experiments (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993
or Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005) which are particularly adept at identifying the factors
that inﬂuence the decisions to provide eﬀort and sabotage, we decided to design a real eﬀort
experiment. In terms of the underlying eﬀort task, our experiment is similar to Konow (2000)
or Falk and Ichino (2006) in that our 160 participants were asked to spend 30 minutes stuﬃng
envelopes.
In each of the 20 sessions (5 per treatment), 8 student participants were provided with
their own computer, work table, “output box,” list of names and addresses and access to
a shared printer. The task was to complete a form letter with names and addresses from
the list, hand address an envelope, print the letter, stuﬀ it into an envelope and then add
it to the output box. The substance of the letter was not contrived: it concerned oﬃcial
department business that based on debrieﬁngs appeared to be salient to the students. The
task was not as simple as ﬁrst seems. From start to ﬁnish, each letter required between 60
and 90 seconds to complete.
After the production period, all of the participants went around the room and examined
the output boxes of the other workers. The “supervisor,” one of the experimenters, also
examined all of the output boxes. Each person counted and recorded the number of com-
pleted envelopes in each of the output boxes and then, on the basis of one envelope chosen at
random from each box, estimated the quality of production, on a scale from 0 to 1. Because
an objective measure of quality, or at least one in which neither the experimenters nor the
participants had a vested interest, was later needed to determine levels of sabotage, we hired
a letter carrier from the US Postal Service to count and evaluate the “deliver-ability” of all
the envelopes.
Finally, at the end of each session, subjects completed a short survey that allowed us
to collect much of the usual demographic data, some information about expectations, in
particular whether each subject expected his or her own output to be reported accurately,
and a measure of risk preferences.
T h es t u d e n t sp a r t i c i p a t e di no n eo ff o u rt r e a t m e n t st h a td i ﬀer with respect to the method
of compensation and the opportunities for sabotage. In the baseline Piece Rate treatment,
participants were paid $1 for each quality adjusted envelope produced. In this case quality
adjusted output depended only on the count and assessment of the supervisor. Where the
4supervisor’s count of participant i is NS→i and his quality assessment is QS→i, the dollar
payoﬀ of worker i in the Piece Rate treatment was:
π
PR
i = NS→i × QS→i
In an eﬀort to maintain the internal validity of the experiment and link the change in the
design to the incentive eﬀects of a tournament, the compensation scheme in the Tournament
treatment is nearly identical to the one in the Piece Rate treatment:
½ ¾
π
T 25 + (NS→i × QS→i) if NS→i × QS→i >N S→j × QS→j   ∀j = i
= i NS→i × QS→i otherwise
A so n ec a ns e et h eo n l yd i ﬀerence was that the highest producer earned a bonus of $25 for
winning the tournament which means that any changes in behavior can be attributed to the
bonus.1
We take advantage of the peer assessments in the Tournament with Sabotage treatment.
In this condition, workers are compensated based on the average quality adjusted output
assessed by all 8 auditors. Now, one’s pay and chances of winning the tournament depend
on the evaluation of the supervisor as in the previous two treatments but one’s peers can
also aﬀect your ﬁnal output assessment. The average assessed output of worker i is:
Ã !
X
Nj→i × Qj→i = Nj→i × Qj→i /8
j =i
and, as a result, her payoﬀ in the Tournament with Sabotage treatment is:
½ ¾
π
T&S 25 + (Nj→i × Qj→i) if Nj→i × Qj→i > Nj→k × Qj→k ∀k =   i
= i Nj→i × Qj→i otherwise
Lastly, to be complete we also ran a Piece Rate with Sabotage treatment that was identical
to the Tournament with Sabotage treatment except no bonus was paid to the producer of
the highest quality adjusted output. While it is clear that to assess the pure incentive eﬀect
of the tournament in the presence of the possibility for sabotage, one needs to compare
1Clearly the expected payoﬀs will be diﬀerent between the Piece Rate and Tournament treatments unless
all participants place zero weight on winning the contest. An alternative would have been to try to maintain
the same expected payoﬀ in the two treatments, but given ability is unobserved in this real eﬀort environment
(although it should be randomly distributed across treatments), it would have been impossible to calibrate
such an alternative design.
5the Tournament with Sabotage treatment to the Piece Rate with Sabotage treatment, it
w o u l db eo d di ft h e r ew e r ed i ﬀerences between the two piece rate treatments because there
is absolutely no incentive to sabotage each other when everyone is paid a piece rate. Indeed,
we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two piece rate treatments and
therefore we pool these data for the purposes of our analysis.
Based on our description of how the four treatments were run, it should be obvious that
there are two avenues through which oﬃce politics and sabotage might aﬀect outcomes in
the experiment. Because winning a promotion tournament often has as much to do with the
perception of being the most productive as it does with actually being the most productive,
overt forms of sabotage, llike the destruction of one another’s output, sometimes give way
to more subtle forms. These acts frequently take the form of rumors or comments aimed at
diminishing the perceived ability or accomplishments of one’s competitors. To some degree,
our experiment is designed to capture both forms of oﬃce politics.
In our design, brazen sabotage occurs when people undercount each other’s output. From
a strategic point of view, it should be obvious that each worker has the incentive to report
zero units produced for each of the 7 other competitors in a tournament. This is how one
maximizes the chance of winning the tournament. That said we suspected that only people
with extremely little integrity would engage is such obvious acts of sabotage.
To provide an environment more conducive to oﬃce politics, we purposely had the partic-
ipants hand write the addresses on all of the envelopes so that there would be both objective,
and possibly subjective, diﬀerences in the assessed quality of the output. This possibility of
subjective peer assessment is at the very heart of oﬃce politics. Just as one has the incentive
to undercount the output produced by one’s competitors, one also has the incentive to un-
derrate the quality of their output. In fact, if counting zero for everyone else dominates, so
does assigning them quality equal to zero. We posited that because quality is so much more
subjective than count, saboteurs might feel more comfortable using it to lower the perceived
productivity of their peers.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Before conducting controlled tests for diﬀerences in our treatments, we begin by describing
our participants and the broad patterns we see in output and sabotage. Table 1 summarizes
the characteristics of our participants based on data from the exit survey. In terms of the
6standard demographics, our participants were roughly evenly split between men and women,
11% were international students, the mean Grade Point Average (GPA) of the participants
was high, and as is typical in the student population, there was not much variation in age.
The two demographics that we were particularly interested in are sex and whether or not one
is an international student because it is easy to formulate hypotheses about these traits being
predictors of ability in this task. Women tend to have better dexterity and hand writing
and international students will be less familiar with English and the U.S. postal system. To
control to some extent for the competitiveness of our participants we collected data on birth
order and the number of siblings one has (Falbo, 1981).
Based on past experience we have little conﬁdence in the self reports of students about
personal or family income and wealth. We therefore asked indirect questions that may be
imperfect proxies for income and wealth but are probably measured with less error and bias.
We asked them for the number of bathrooms in their parent’s house, whether they had a car
on campus and whether they were employed during the school year. Precise measurements
of the marginal eﬀects of income and wealth are well beyond the purview of the current
experiment — we simply want to control for diﬀerences.
We collected two other control variables in the survey. To account for the risk preferences
of our participants we had the participants complete the Weber et al (2002) risk preference
scale and created an indicator variable for those persons who ranked among the top 10% in
risk taking. We also asked each participant to tell us the number of other participants in
the session that they knew. We considered this to be a control for social distance, and the
possibility of collusion, within a session. On average, people knew one or two of the other
participants.
Lastly, we were interested in the extent to which participants would anticipate sabotage
and how this expectation would aﬀect their performance in the production task. We asked,
“Did you expect your teammates to correctly report your production output?” Overall,
most (88%) of people expected the other participants in their session to correctly assess
their output. As we will see however, this expectation is less “rosy” for participants in
the Tournament with Sabotage treatment. Here only 60% thought their output would be
counted correctly). We will also see that these expectations matter a lot.
Three important aspects of our data are depicted in Figure 1 which reports the mean
postal worker count of raw output (black bars), the mean quality adjusted count of the postal
7worker (dark grey bars) and the mean peer adjusted count (light grey bars) for the three
treatments.2 Perhaps the most important thing to notice is the disincentive eﬀect of the
threat of sabotage. As reported elsewhere (e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997 or van Dijk
et al., 2001), adding the $25 bonus for the highest producer increases raw eﬀort (proxied
here by the simple postal worker envelope count — black bars). The number of envelopes
produced increases by 1.125 on average (z =1 .84,p=0 .06)w h e nw em o v ef r o mp i e c er a t e s
to the tournament.3 The diﬀerence of 1.125 envelopes does not seem large, but remember
that our participants only produced for 30 minutes. Over the course of an 8 hour day, the
8 workers would produce 144 more envelopes in the Tournament condition. However, what
is important is that raw output actually falls compared to both the Tournament (z =3 .36,
p<0.01) and the Piece Rate treatment (z =2 .03,p=0 .04)w h e nc o m p e t i t o r sa r ea b l et o
sabotage each other. It is one thing to discover the presence of sabotage and the lowering of
output as the direct result of sabotage but to ﬁnd that just the potential for sabotage acts
as a large disincentive to providing eﬀort is unique to this experiment. On average, workers
produce 2.475 fewer envelopes when sabotage can alter the course of a tournament.
If one compares the black raw output bar to the dark grey quality adjusted output bar
within each treatment one gets a sense of the extent to which quality varied by treatment.
One might expect quality to be lower in the tournaments because people feel more pressure
to rush but because they will be paid based on the number of quality adjusted envelopes,
it is risky to produce slipshod output. The 2.53 quality adjusted envelope diﬀerence in the
Piece Rate treatment is similar to the 2.48 diﬀerence in the Tournament but the diﬀerence is
slightly larger in the Tournament with Sabotage treatment, 2.67 envelopes. If one regresses
quality on treatment indicators only, the small diﬀerences appear to be signiﬁcant. The
Tournament with Sabotage treatment yields lower quality of 0.06 compared to the Piece
Rate treatment (p<0.10) and 0.07 less than the Tournament (p<0.05).4
Figure 1 also suggests that the experiment was successful in eliciting diﬀerences in sabo-
tage that make sense. Recall that there is no monetary incentive to sabotage one’s peers in
either the Piece Rate or Tournament treatments, but nonetheless, we allowed participants to
count and rate each other to provide important benchmarks. In the Piece Rate treatment it
2Note: the peer adjusted count is the mean assessment of the 7 other participants only and recall that
there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two piece rate treatments so they have been
pooled to simplify and sharpen the analysis.
3We report z statistics from the nonparametric Wilcoxon test.
4Recall that quality is measured on [0,1] scale.
8appears as if people actually made small gifts to each other, on average. One can see this by
comparing the dark grey quality adjusted count of the postal worker to the light grey peer
adjusted count.5 When nothing is at stake, there is no harm in being nice to one’s peers.
T h es a m ei sn o tt r u ei nt h eT o u r n a m e n t .H e r ew eﬁnd that people sabotage each other
even when there is no material incentive to do so. The diﬀerence of almost one quality
adjusted envelope is just signiﬁcant (z =1 .66,p=0 .09)a n dc a nb es y m p t o m a t i co fas i m p l e ,
maybe even unconscious or aﬀective/emotional response to competition (Schultheiss et al.,
1999). When given the material incentive in the Tournament with Sabotage treatment, one
can see much lower peer adjusted output. Compared to the evaluation of the letter carrier,
peers credit each other with producing an average of about two adjusted envelopes less than
the letter carrier and the diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (z =2 .81,p<0.01). As a rough
comparison of magnitudes, if the eﬀects of the bonus and the ability to reduce the output
of others are additive, then it appears that aﬀect accounts for 47% of the overall sabotage
that occurs in the Tournament with Sabotage treatment.6 The remaining 53% of sabotage
is likely to be cognitive and strategy-driven.
4E c o n o m e t r i c R e s u l t s
Our ﬁrst and most important results concern the relationship between compensation and
adjusted output, and these are contained in Table 2. The ﬁrst column reports least squares
estimates, with robust standard errors, for the regression of adjusted individual output on the
two tournament treatment indicators. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Relative to the combined Piece Rate treatment, adjusted output is estimated to rise 1.171
per person, or 9.368 = 8(1.171) per team, in the Tournament. When sabotage is possible,
on the other hand, adjusted output per worker falls not just relative to the tournament
(t =2 .87,p=0 .01), but to the combined Piece Rate treatments.
The addition of indicators for sex, international student status and risk preferences has
little eﬀect on these treatment eﬀects: the estimated coeﬃcients retain both their size and
signiﬁcance. Also, the estimated coeﬃcients for sex and international student status are
negative and signiﬁcant in both the statistical and economic senses, and are consistent, we
believe, with the nature of the task, one in which keyboard dexterity, neat handwriting and
5However, the diﬀerence in the two means is not signiﬁcant (z =1 .03,p=0 .30).
60.95 of the 2.03 diﬀerence between postal worker assessment and peer assessment in the Tournament
with Sabotage treatment.
9ﬂuency in English were favored.
The observation that risk takers are estimated to produce 1.781 fewer envelopes, and
that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, calls for a more subtle explanation.
It is our hypothesis that risk takers are more likely than other subjects to skimp on quality
in an eﬀort to ﬁnish more envelopes, a conjecture with important implications for personnel
management. We ﬁnd support for this view in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix, which
report the results for separate (raw) quantity and quality regressions. Combined, the second
and third columns of Tables A1 and A2 suggest that risk takers produce about the same
number of envelopes but spend less eﬀo r to ne a c h .I ft h es t r o n gq u a l i t ye ﬀect comes as no
surprise, the insigniﬁcant quantity eﬀect is unexpected: our prior was that a risk taker would
attempt to produce more, but inferior, envelopes.
The last columns in Table 2 reveal that the addition of the expectations variable, whether
or not subjects anticipate that their output will be reported correctly, has two marked eﬀects,
with or without other demographic controls. First, the coeﬃcient for risk takers shrinks in
both size and signiﬁcance.
Second and most importantly, the treatment eﬀect for tournaments with sabotage van-
ishes. It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that quality adjusted output falls in this
environment because fewer individuals expect their co-workers to be truthful about their
contributions to production and, as a result, eﬀort is reduced. In more evocative terms,
ﬁrms in which promotion is the result of oﬃce politics will become less proﬁtable, not be-
cause output is ever lost or ruined, but because it is never produced.7
But were such expectations reasonable? That is, did our subjects sabotage one another
more often in the tournament? And what other inﬂuences can be identiﬁed? Figure 2
illustrates the incidence and amount of output sabotage in the three treatments. As one
can see almost 80% of the evaluations were correct in the Piece Rate treatment but this
number fall to only less than 60% in the Tournament and further still to less than 50% in
the Tournament with Sabotage. Furthermore, there are a lot of observations considerably
to the right of zero in the Tournament with Sabotage indicating signiﬁcant sabotage. It is
one thing to mis-count by one or two envelopes as occurs in the Piece Rate treatment but
there are 22 instances of the target’s output being evaluated as less than ﬁve units and 9
instances in which the evaluator reduced the target’s output to zero. All of these instances
7The results reported in tables 2, A1 and A2 are all robust to clustering standard errors at the session
level or using the Tobit regressor (because there are so few censored observations).
10occurred in the Tournament with Sabotage.
For a more systematic analysis of output sabotage, Table 3 reports GLS estimates with
individual random eﬀects (vij) for three models of output sabotage, all based on the spline
function:
OSij = β0 + β1T + β2TS+ β3(Qj − Qi)+β4(Qj − Qi)T + β5(Qj − Qi)TS
+β6 max{Qj − Qi,0} + β7 max{Qj − Qi,0}T + β8 max{Qj − Qi,0}TS
− →
+Xθ+ ui + vij
where OSij is i’s undercount (positive) or overcount (negative) of j’s output, T and TS are
− →
the tournament treatment indicators, Qj − Qi is the objective diﬀerence in output and X
is a vector of controls. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, for example, no controls are included, and
the only estimated coeﬃc i e n tt h a ti ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better is that on
max{Qj −Qi,0}TS. That is, it is only in Tournaments with Sabotage, and then only when
the target has produced more output, that the model predicts systematic miscounting of any
kind. As the implied sabotage functions in Figure 3 reveal, however, those who produce more
output should expect substantial undercounts: in particular, a four envelope diﬀerence will
be reported as three, a surprise inasmuch as there are other, more subtle, forms of sabotage
available.
The estimates in the second and third columns hint that the result is a robust one. No
matter what other controls are included, neither the size nor the signiﬁcance of the relevant
coeﬃcients are aﬀected. Furthermore, results not reported here reveal that the results are
also robust with respect to the speciﬁcation of the error term: the same patterns prevail
when errors are instead clustered on the individual. The data also demonstrate that, once
more, expectations matter. Those who expect co-workers to report their output correctly
will sabotage them less, an example of complex or expectational reciprocity: if A expects B
to report A’s output correctly, then A will correctly report B’s, and so on. Inasmuch as one
o ft h ec o n t r o l si n c l u d e di nt h et h i r ds p e c i ﬁcation is the number of other subjects known, this
is more than a "friendship eﬀect."
Given the diﬀerences between the two forms of oﬃce politics, we expected false reports of
quality, in either direction, to be more common and more responsive to output diﬀerences.
Figure 4 shows that there is much more variation in the quality sabotage data reﬂecting
the partially subjective nature of this sort of assessment. As in Figure 2, however, we see
that the number of cases in which the peer evaluator agreed with the letter carrier decreases
11dramatically from the Piece Rate to the Tournament and even further to the Tournament
with Sabotage. While the distribution of evaluation diﬀerences is fairly symmetric around
zero in the Piece rate treatment, it is skewed slightly to the right in the Tournament and
skewed dramatically to the right in the Tournament with Sabotage. Indeed, as expected,
there is a lot of quality sabotage in the Tournament with Sabotage and there is even a
signiﬁcant amount in the Tournament despite there being no incentive to sabotage one’s
coworkers.
Table 4 reports estimates for three models that, apart from the dependent variable, are
identical to those used to characterize quantity sabotage:
QSij = γ0 + γ1T + γ2TS+ γ3(Qj − Qi)+γ4(Qj − Qi)T + γ5(Qj − Qi)TS
+γ6 max{Qj − Qi,0} + γ7 max{Qj − Qi,0}T + γ8 max{Qj − Qi,0}TS
− →
+XΛ + ei +  ij
where QSij is now i’s underestimate (positive) or overestimate (negative) of the quality of
j’s output. The most immediate diﬀerence between Tables 3 and 4 is that almost all of the
coeﬃcients γ0,...,γ8 are signiﬁcant, consistent with our prior.
To understand better their implications, consider the implied sabotage functions for the
benchmark speciﬁcation in which no other terms are included, as depicted in Figure 5. Even
when there is no diﬀerence in output, subjects engage in signiﬁcant positive sabotage in
both tournament treatments. Underestimation is more pronounced when it matters most, in
tournaments with sabotage, but even in the standard tournament, it exists as what we believe
to be an aﬀective response. The further observation that the quality sabotage function more
or less levels oﬀ for positive output diﬀerences in the standard tournament lends credence to
this view. The response to co-workers who produce more is not "calibrated" in any obvious
sense.
In tournaments with sabotage, on the other hand, underestimation always becomes more
pronounced with diﬀerences in output, even if the small, but statistically signiﬁcant, decrease
in the slope of the function to the right of the "knot" is diﬃcult to rationalize.
Figure 5 also illustrates that the "sabotage threshold" - that is, the diﬀerence in output
suﬃcient to induce underestimation - is not just negative, but almost equal, in the two sorts
of tournaments, and that below this, the amount of "negative sabotage" (i.e., gifts) increases
more slowly in the standard tournament.
12All of this stands in marked contrast to behavior in the combined piece rate treatment,
in which the extent of sabotage is predicted to decrease, albeit slowly, as output diﬀerences
increase, and the level of sabotage associated with no diﬀerence in output is negative. For
that matter and consistent with Figure 1, at most values of the diﬀerence in output, par-
ticipants in the Piece Rate condition actually make small quality gifts to their coworkers.
Furthermore, because the estimated change in the slope of the sabotage function at the knot
is statistically insigniﬁcant, the rate at which sabotage declines is independent of whether
the diﬀerence in output is positive or negative.
Once more, we are conﬁdent that our results are robust. On the one hand, the results are
not much diﬀerent when the errors are clustered at the individual level. More important, as
the second and third columns in Table 4 attest, the addition of the now familiar controls for
sex, international student status, risk preferences, expectations and so on has little eﬀect,
whether or not other controls are also used. There is perhaps less evidence of reciprocity,
however: the coeﬃcient on expectations has the right (that is, positive) sign, but is no longer
signiﬁcant.
5 Concluding Remarks
In lieu of the usual rehash of motives and results, let us instead focus on some of their
implications. On a practical level, the obvious question is whether managers should foster
competition among coworkers or explicitly set up promotion tournaments? One clear answer
is that if oﬃce politics can have an eﬀect on output, either directly or indirectly in terms
of lost productivity due to political maneuvering, then between worker competition should
be avoided. Workers have good reason to be wary of the sorts of peer review mentioned in
the introduction. Our results suggest that when there is any ambiguity in the performance
of a competitor, workers are likely to engage in sabotage. Not only will time be spent on
unproductive tasks, the atmosphere itself created by a tournament can be a disincentive to
work hard. The second eﬀect is the main empirical contribution of our study.
It is also not clear whether one should use tournaments even when oﬃce politics can
be kept to a minimum. Recall the estimates of the eﬀect of the tournament on adjusted
output in Table 2. If the bonus is substantial (i.e., the diﬀerence in pay grades is large
from one level to the next in the context of Lazear, 1989 or Drago and Garvey, 1998), it is
not clear that the increased productivity provided by the competition outweighs the added
13labor costs. The per worker increase when comparing piece rates to the tournament is 1.171
units. This means an increase of 1.171 × 8=9 .368 units for the team. Since labor costs in
the tournament are therefore 34.368 = 25 + 9.368 more, the tournament is only worth it if
9.368ρ ≥ 34.368 or ρ ≥ 3.57,w h e r eρ is the sales price per ﬁnished envelope.
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157T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
TABLE 1: Participant Characteristics 
N  M e a n  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Male  160  0.463  0.500  0  1 
International Student  160  0.113  0.317  0  1 
Risk Scale  160  128.600  25.176  0  203 
Risk Taker (90th percentile Risk Scale)  160  0.100  0.301  0  1 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  160  0.888  0.317  0  1 
Age  160  20.019  1.385  18  23 
GPA  158  3.486  0.281  2.55  4 
First Born  160  0.581  0.495  0  1 
Number of Siblings  160  1.569  1.164  0  7 
Number of Bathrooms in Parent's House  160  3.066  1.528  0  9 
Have a Car on Campus  160  0.406  0.493  0  1 
Employed  160  2.225  0.997  0  4 
Number of Participants Known  159  1.277  1.272  0  8 
16TABLE 2: Analysis of Objectively Adjusted Output 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Tournament  1.171*  1.138**  1.165**  1.370** 
(0.59)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.55) 
Tournament with Sabotage  -1.494*  -1.680**  0.188  0.347 
(0.77)  (0.72)  (0.79)  (0.76) 
Male  -1.265**  -1.220**  -1.300** 
(0.52)  (0.49)  (0.51) 
International Student  -3.125***  -3.239***  -3.561*** 
(0.72)  (0.65)  (0.75) 
Risk Taker  -1.781*  -0.624  -0.447 
(0.93)  (0.97)  (1.01) 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  4.746***  4.515*** 
(1.08)  (1.16) 
Intercept  11.121*** 12.291***  7.481***  15.989*** 
(0.36)  (0.45)  (1.23)  (5.42) 
Includes demographic controls  No  No  No  Yes 
R - s q u a r e d  0 . 0 7  0 . 2 0  0 . 3 2  0 . 3 5 
N  160  160  160  157 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; the omitted treatment is piece rate; column (4) 
includes controls for age, GPA, birth order, number of siblings, employment status, the 
number of other participants known and proxies for family wealth. 
17TABLE 3: Analysis of Output Sabotage 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Tournament  0.130  0.095  0.084 
(0.34)  (0.34)  (0.35) 
Tournament with Sabotage  -0.025  -0.373  -0.306 
(0.33)  (0.36)  (0.38) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)  0.046  0.052  0.042 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)×Tournament  0.131  0.119  0.127 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)×Tournament with Sabotage  0.037  0.016  0.035 
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}  0.061  0.058  0.078 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}×Tournament  -0.131  -0.123  -0.124 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}×Tournament with Sabotage  0.260**  0.263**  0.229* 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Male  0.185  0.219 
(0.22)  (0.23) 
International Student  -0.372  -0.405 
(0.34)  (0.38) 
Risk Taker  0.194  0.228 
(0.38)  (0.40) 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  -0.905**  -0.829* 
(0.42)  (0.44) 
Intercept  0.120  0.957**  -2.450 
(0.20)  (0.48)  (2.27) 
Includes demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
rho  0.28  0.26  0.27 
Wald Chi-squared  109  119  123 
N  1093  1093  1072 
Note: GLS with individual random effects; the omitted treatment is piece rate; column (3) includes controls 
for age, GPA, birth order, number of siblings, employment status, the number of other participants known 
and proxies for family wealth. 
18TABLE 4: Analysis of Quality Sabotage 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Tournament  0.147***  0.146***  0.123*** 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Tournament with Sabotage  0.232***  0.203***  0.222*** 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)  -0.011**  -0.011**  -0.012** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)×Tournament  0.033***  0.032***  0.033*** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output)×Tournament with Sabotage  0.044***  0.044***  0.045*** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}  0.005  0.005  0.004 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}×Tournament  -0.027*  -0.027*  -0.025* 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
max {(Target's Output - Saboteur's Output), 0}×Tournament with Sabotage  -0.025**  -0.025**  -0.025** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Male  -0.003  -0.009 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
International Student  0.008  0.015 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
Risk Taker  0.005  0.002 
(0.05)  (0.06) 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  -0.075  -0.049 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
Intercept  -0.044*  0.031  -0.135 
(0.02)  (0.07)  (0.31) 
Includes demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
rho  0.44  0.44  0.45 
Wald Chi-squared  93  95  100 
N  1093  1093  1072 
Note: GLS with individual random effects; the omitted treatment is piece rate; column (3) includes controls 
for age, GPA, birth order, number of siblings, employment status, the number of other participants known 
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FIGURE 1: Mean Production Levels by Treatment
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FIGURE 2: Output Sabotage by Treatment (Note: two observation in the Tournament
with Sabotage treatment have been deleted {-20, 24} to make the graph easier to read).
21FIGURE 3: Estimated Output Sabotage Functions by Treatment (Note: the horizontal
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FIGURE 4: Quality Sabotage by Treatment
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1 FIGURE 5: Estimated Quality Sabotage Functions by Treatment (Note: the horizontal
axis is the diﬀerence between the target’s and the saboteur’s raw output).
248 Appendix: Supplemental Regression Tables and Ex-
perimental Instructions
TABLE A1: Analysis of Objectively Assessed Output 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Tournament  1.125*  1.062*  1.075*  1.316** 
(0.58)  (0.56)  (0.57)  (0.59) 
Tournament with Sabotage  -1.350*  -1.445**  -0.573  -0.437 
(0.72)  (0.70)  (0.86)  (0.85) 
Male  -0.722  -0.701  -0.805 
(0.53)  (0.53)  (0.55) 
International Student  -2.439***  -2.492***  -2.670*** 
(0.65)  (0.65)  (0.77) 
Risk Taker  0.084  0.624  0.716 
(0.94)  (0.97)  (1.06) 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  2.217*  2.124 
(1.26)  (1.35) 
Intercept  13.650*** 14.290*** 12.043*** 16.998*** 
(0.39)  (0.50)  (1.44)  (5.84) 
Includes demographic controls  No  No  No  Yes 
R - s q u a r e d  0 . 0 6  0 . 1 2  0 . 1 5  0 . 1 7 
N  160  160  160  157 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; the omitted treatment is piece rate; column (4) 
includes controls for age, GPA, birth order, number of siblings, employment status, the 
number of other participants known and proxies for family wealth. 
25TABLE A2: Analysis of Objectively Assessed Quality 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Tournament  0.01  0.011  0.013  0.011 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Tournament with Sabotage  -0.060*  -0.068**  0.042*  0.048** 
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Male  -0.048**  -0.046***  -0.048** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
International Student  -0.099**  -0.106***  -0.116*** 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Risk Taker  -0.136***  -0.068  -0.055 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
E(Teammates to correctly report my output)  0.281***  0.273*** 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
Intercept  0.817***  0.866***  0.581***  0.951*** 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.16) 
Includes demographic controls  No  No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.037  0.189  0.44  0.476 
N  160  160  160  157 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors; the omitted treatment is piece rate; column (4) 
includes controls for age, GPA, birth order, number of siblings, employment status, the 
number of other participants known and proxies for family wealth. 
Instructions (all treatments)
You have been asked to participate in a production experiment. For your participation
today you will earn an amount of money that depends on your performance in the experiment.
A n ye a r n e dm o n e yw i l lb ep a i dt oy o ui nc a s ha tt h ee n do ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .
In this experiment you will be completing a production task that consists of:
• Addressing and printing letters
• Putting the letters in envelopes
26• Hand-addressing the envelopes
Each of you will be assigned to one of the work stations in the room. After the experi-
menter demonstrates how the tasks should be completed, you will work for 30 minutes.
It is important that all these tasks are completed correctly because these letters are
addressed to candidates for a new position in the Economics Department.
A tt h ee n do f3 0m i n u t e sy o uw i l le a c hb ea s k e dt og oa r o u n dt oe a c ho ft h eo t h e r
participant’s stations and count their output. You will write down your count of their output
on a record sheet that you will be provided. To assure quality, you will then randomly choose
one of their letters to open and check, both the letter and the envelope, for mistakes. You
will then write down your assessment of the quality of the person’s work on the record
sheet. Your quality assessment for each individual will be a number between 0 and 1 where
1 indicates that the work is acceptable and 0 indicates that it is not acceptable.
The experimenter will also go around to each work station to count the output and assess
the quality of each participant’s work.
Do not write your name on any of the sheets you are given. Only put your participant
number in the space provided at the top of the record sheet. We do this to maintain
anonymity in the experiment. By only using your participant number, the other participants
will not know your assessment of their output and the experimenter will never be able to
link your actions to you by name.
After all the counts and quality assessments are turned in, you will ﬁll out a brief survey
and the experimenter will enter all the count and quality information into a spreadsheet.
When every one is done with the survey you will be paid according to the following com-
pensation scheme.
Compensation (Piece Rate)
The group will be working under a piece rate compensation scheme. Your piece rate
compensation will be:
Pay= N × Q × $X
where N is the count of your production by the experimenter, Q is your quality rating
assigned by the experimenter and $X is the piece rate.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Compensation (Tournament)
The group will be working under a piece rate compensation scheme. However, there is
27also the potential for you to win a bonus. Your piece rate compensation will be:
Pay= N × Q × $X
where N i st h ea v e r a g ec o u n to fy o u rp r o d u c t i o nb yt h ee x p e r i m e n t e r ,Q is your quality
rating assigned by the experimenter and $X is the piece rate. On top of this, the participant
who has the highest quality adjusted output (N × Q) will be awarded a bonus of $Z.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Compensation (Piece Rate with Sabotage)
The group will be working under a piece rate compensation scheme. Your piece rate
compensation will be:
Pay= NAV G × QAV G × $X
where NAV G is the average count of your production by the other participants and the
experimenter, QAV G is your average quality rating assigned by the other participants and
the experimenter and $X is the piece rate.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Compensation (Tournament with Sabotage)
The group will be working under a piece rate compensation scheme. However, there is
also the potential for you to win a bonus. Your piece rate compensation will be:
Pay= NAV G × QAV G × $X
where NAV G is the average count of your production by the other participants and the
experimenter, QAV G is your average quality rating assigned by the other participants and the
experimenter and $X is the piece rate. On top of this, the participant who has the highest
quality adjusted output (NAV G × QAV G) will be awarded a bonus of $Z.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
28